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ABSTRACT 
 
The conflict in Colombia has been ongoing for more than five decades, making it the longest 
ongoing internal armed conflict in the Western hemisphere. This has impacted millions of 
Colombians by creating an environment of instability and distrust, in which atrocities have 
flourished unpunished. Over the past decade Colombia has undertaken Transitional Justice 
mechanisms in its endeavor towards peace and justice. The implementation of Transitional 
Justice in an ongoing conflict makes it a unique case, one which requires careful deliberation as 
it might change the ways in which transitions from mass atrocities have been addressed. In order 
to understand how Transitional Justice can be used to secure justice during an on-going conflict, 
this study adopts Nancy Fraser’s critical theory of justice. The framework provided by Fraser 
thus serves as a scale of justice, against which the Transitional Justice framework in Colombia is 
measured. This project investigates the degree to which justice is reached from the three 
dimensions of Nancy Fraser’s justice theory. The study concludes by suggesting that a three-
dimensional approach to justice would increase prospects of justice for victims of the armed 
conflict in Colombia.	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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In many nations throughout the world and throughout many centuries, there have occurred mass 
atrocities that left the nations shocked, scarred, unstable and unable. The time between the end of 
a conflict and the establishment of stability is a crucial period during which a nation must build 
new structures, ensure safety and security and address the apprehensive public. It is the time 
when the government must gain the citizens’ trust and comply with international requirements. 
Today, this period is referred to as Transitional Justice (TJ). 
Even though the term Transitional Justice did not emerge until the late 20th century, 
scholars claim that post-conflict procedures such as war crime tribunals and trials and purges can 
be traced back to ancient Athens more than 2,000 years ago (Arthur, 2009). Ruti Teitel asserts 
that modern Transitional Justice had its first phase following World War I and was evident in the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. Although this phase lasted for only about five years, the memory of the 
post-war trials criminalized the violations by the state and created the foundation for modern 
human rights law. The second phase was associated with the influx of democratic transitions 
beginning in the late 1990s. Even though political changes in Eastern Europe, South Africa and 
South America were characterized as isolated events by some, they showed the newfound trust in 
international power politics. The last phase is identified with the current conditions that have 
created the foundation for an established law of violence and discussions of humanitarian justice, 
which led to a body of law (Teitel, 2003). This study will analyze the use of Transitional Justice 
procedures in an unusual way – before the end of a conflict.   
During the recent decade, Colombia has been implementing mechanisms of Transitional 
Justice in order to end the armed conflict that has been ongoing for the past 50 years. By 
implementing Transitional Justice during an armed conflict, Colombia began using this tool as it 
has never been used before and has sparked many national and international debates about its 
potential. Will this change the way in which we have thought of transitions, and unravel the vast 
potential of Transitional Justice, or will it merely undermine justice and lead to impunity in the 
already wounded country? 
 
 
2 
 
2.0 PROBLEM AREA 
Ever since the country’s independency, the Colombian government has centralized its efforts 
around the larger cities, leading to a wide gap between rural and urban areas (Jonsson, 2014). 
Rural villages have, for the same reason, depended mostly on self-defense groups and 
community initiatives for basic tasks. Furthermore, political representation has been weak, and 
recurring violent confrontations between conservative and liberal forces have meant that 
Colombia has been prone to civil conflict throughout most of its history. These political and 
social tensions were the main motivations for groups of rural poor to arm in what became the 
first guerilla groups in 1964. These groups took control over large pieces of land and fought the 
government with the objective of a Marxist revolution (ibid). This marked the beginning of the 
present conflict, which is being fought between different guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, drug 
cartels and official armed forces. The result has been more than five decades of violence, 5.2 
million displaced (Summers, 2014), 27.000 kidnapped, 25.000 disappeared and 218.000 lost 
lives, of which 81% were civilians, according to official numbers (CMH, n.d.). 
This has left the government with the extensive task of not only ending the conflict once 
and for all, but also of ensuring justice to the more than 6 million victims1 resulting from it. After 
several failed peace negotiations, the government finally engaged in extensive peace talks with 
the main guerrilla group, FARC, in 2012. This is part of a process initiated by former Colombian 
President Uribe, who dedicated himself to eradicate all illicit armed groups and regain control 
over Colombian territory (Jonsson, 2014). This process started as an aggressive strategy, which 
relied mainly on the Colombian armed forces to fight the guerillas and eradicate drug trafficking 
networks. Despite its success in fighting guerilla groups, the strategy was highly disputed as it 
escalated violence and included several controversial practices as ‘false positives’2 and the aerial 
fumigation plan, financed by the US government.  
Around this same period, the government changed its rhetoric towards victims’ rights and 
proclaimed its commitment to Transitional Justice with the implementation of the Justice and 
Peace Law in 2005. This created a framework for criminal prosecutions of demobilized 
combatants and opened up for victims’ reparations. The practical consequence of this change 
                                                
1 6,2 million victims registered under the Victims Law. The number of victims is suspected to be considerably 
higher. 
2 This practice is discussed in the literature review (section 4.0) 
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has, however, been debated from both sides. In 2011, the government further developed and 
crystallized the framework of Transitional Justice through the implementation of the Victims’ 
Law. While being praised for putting victims’ right central to the government’s agenda, several 
victims’ continue to be excluded from the legislation while others fear repercussions for making 
justice claims (Summers, 2014). Current President Santos took this process a step further than his 
predecessor when he initiated the official peace talks in February 2012 taking place in Havana, 
Cuba. The peace negotiations are centralized around six topics: Agricultural development 
policies; Political participation; Ending of the conflict; Solution to the problem of illicit drugs; 
Victims; Implementation, verification and ratification (LSE, 2014).  
This study assesses the efforts implemented by the Colombian government to ensure 
justice for the many victims of the armed conflict, while simultaneously striving for peace and 
stability. It furthermore seeks to comprehend the struggle of balancing justice against peace in 
Colombia. In order to come closer to the prospect of achieving true justice, this study adopts the 
critical theory of justice formulated by Nancy Fraser. Fraser divides the concept in three 
elements: recognition, distribution and representation. These categories represent respectively 
the cultural, the economic and the political aspect of justice. By adopting a critical perspective, 
Fraser also defines sources of injustice, which are also utilized to understand the case of 
Colombia. The inclusion of recognition, redistribution and representation allows this study to 
take a three-dimensional look at the obstacles of achieving justice in Colombia. Adopting this 
theoretical framework facilitates an analysis of the adoption of Transitional Justice mechanisms 
in Colombia, together with its consequences as well as limitations. 
Due to the complexity of the Colombian armed conflict, there are many aspects yet to be 
discovered. The present study, however, puts an emphasis on the use of a Transitional Justice 
framework during an ongoing conflict, and the prospects for peace in this particular context. 
With this aim, the following research question will guide the analysis: 
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2.1 Research Question 
How does the Transitional Justice framework contribute to fostering justice in Colombia? 
 
2.1.1 Working Questions 
1. How do TJ efforts in Colombia approach justice? 
2. How could TJ efforts lead to injustices in Colombia? 
3. How can the Westphalian framework of justice be limiting to the case of Colombia? 
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3.0 CONTEXTUALIZATION  
Since the 1950s, Colombia has experienced a permanent state of armed conflict, making it one of 
the oldest running armed conflicts in the world (Vidal-Lopez 2012; Villegas 2014). In the years 
after its independence, Colombia has been prone to several civil wars between liberal and 
conservative parties. In 1899 liberals pursued a revolution to protest their long time exclusion 
from power. This led to the War of a Thousand Days, which ended in 1902 in conservative 
victory. Political tensions, however, persisted, further triggered by the growing inequality 
between urban and rural areas. The inequality and violence in rural areas made the liberal mayor 
of Bogotá advocate a series of socialist reforms in the 1940s, which were highly contested by 
conservatives who nonetheless ended up winning the following elections. Following the 
conservative victory, the mayor of Bogotá was assassinated in 1948 which, together with a 
struggle for land reform, triggered a decade of civil war in between liberals and conservatives, 
which is now referred to as La Violencia3. It was not until 1957 that the two political wings 
reached an agreement to split power equally in between the two. Finally ending the conflict, the 
agreement also led to a complete exclusion of left-wing parties from political power. Inspired by 
the Cuban revolution and enraged by the attacks of rural settlements by the Colombian Armed 
Forces, several left-wing armed groups of peasants emerged to form guerrilla groups in the 
1960s. The beginning of the current conflict is usually dated to 1964, the year in which the first 
guerilla group was established; Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del 
Pueblo4 (FARC-EP). In the following years, more groups followed: ELN (Army of National 
Liberation), EPL (Popular Liberation Army) in 1967 and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) in 
1974 (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 2010; Villegas, 2014). 
These armed organizations assigned themselves the task of protecting the rural poor from 
the oligarchy (Jonsson, 2014: 98). Due to the ‘exceptional situation’ of violence, a law was 
introduced in 1965, which allowed civil groups to arm (ibid). This encouraged the formation of 
several auto-defense groups that emerged in the following years and eventually turned out to be 
the most violent actors of the conflict (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 2010). 
In the 1980s the paramilitary groups forged agreements with the Medellin and Cali drug 
cartels in order to protect land, essential for cocaine production and distribution, which triggered 
                                                
3 English translation: The Violence 
4 English translation: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army 
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an even more aggressive guerrilla offensive (Villegas, 2014). With the ambitious goal of 
overthrowing the government, FARC decided to involve with the emerging drug-trade in the 
1980s, as it needed funds to extend operations. They began by taxing coca buyers and claimed to 
ensure a fair payment for coca farmers. Over time however FARC also got deeply involved in 
drug trafficking, leading to its rapid growth in the following ten years. It eventually grew so 
powerful that regional elites and organized crime groups regarded it being a substantial threat. 
During this period, some regional governments sought to negotiate peace with the armed groups 
(Jonsson, 2014). Former Colombian President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) attempted peace 
negotiations with guerilla groups through promises of amnesty, however, after about 373 ex 
combatants were favored with these amnesties, the agreement failed and violence intensified 
(Villegas, 2014).  
As part of a second round of peace negotiations with guerilla groups, the legal foundation 
for the existence of paramilitary groups was revoked in 1989. This was followed by a brief 
period of calm. In 1991, the government, lacking power and resources already, amended the 
constitution to allow armed groups to capture local institutions, which further weakened the 
government (Summers, 2012). However, as violence increased shortly after, a new legal 
framework allowing paramilitaries, with a revised definition, was introduced in 1994 (Garcia-
Godos & Lid, 2010). The modern paramilitaries arising from this law organized under the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia5 (AUC) in order to facilitate its joint action against the 
guerrillas (Jonsson, 2014). These groups enjoyed wide support from the national army, 
governmental alliances and drug cartels, which led to a confusing combination of alliances and 
simultaneous clashes in between guerrillas, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers and public 
security forces (CIDH, 2012). The paramilitaries became responsible for mass killings and 
massacres, leading to the clash between the guerrillas and paramilitary groups in the 90s to 
become one of the most violent periods in the history of Colombia (Jonsson, 2014). Soon, 
paramilitary leaders forged agreements with specific drug cartels to protect land corridors that 
were used to produce and distribute cocaine – an alliance that provoked an even more aggressive 
guerrilla offence. At this time, the FARC became more powerful and began executing strategic 
attacks against civilians, such as disappearances, kidnappings and bomb attacks (Villegas 2014).  
                                                
5 English translation: United Colombian Auto-defenders 
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As time went on, political leanings of the groups involved became less relevant and the 
conflict turned into a competition for economic and military control over areas that are resource-
rich and important for drug producing and trafficking (Summers, 2012). All of these armed 
groups were infiltrated in state affairs and succeeded in influencing election processes and 
judicial functions through the use of blackmailing and kidnappings (CIDH, 2012: 47). The 
colombian government lost control over large parts of the country and “[i]n 2002 they 
[paramilitaries] claimed to control 35 per cent of the Colombian national Congress, and one-
third of Colombia’s municipalities” (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 2010: 493).  
The Colombian government responded to this by allocating more resources to the armed 
forces as well as widening the scope of their tasks. In the wake of the presidential election in 
2002, some of the leaders from the AUC declared a unilateral ceasefire in order to negotiate 
demobilization. A peace agreement was made in July 2003, which assured the demobilization of 
groups in return for providing alternative penalties for prosecuted members of the illegal armed 
groups. The peace agreement, paired with the aggressive military efforts towards guerillas led to 
a significant reduction in violence (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 2010). Even though these efforts 
succeeded in demobilizing several paramilitary groups, there were still groups that did not take 
part in the agreements. Furthermore, many demobilized members would come together to form 
new groups that would seek to dominate the leftover territories of demobilized groups and gain 
control over drug trafficking. In fact, an estimated 10,000 men have joined the new groups, half 
of which were demobilized members of former organizations (Summers, 2012). 
 
3.1 Colombia’s Legislative History - Conflict and Displacement 
Over the past few decades, the Colombian government has begun to take greater care of 
the victims of the armed conflict. One of the first direct legislations that addressed the victims, 
Law 387, was passed in 1997 and declared the state as responsible for the care of displaced 
persons; however, the law failed to instill protective mechanisms and in the late 1990s and early 
2000s a series of laws allowed the paramilitaries legal expropriation without mandatory 
compensation. These laws handed over a lot of power to the paramilitaries and allowed their 
dispossession practices (Summers, 2012).  
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In 2002, Law 782 was implemented to facilitate the peace negotiations with the AUC. 
The law, however, met strong resistance from national and international Human Rights 
Organizations that accused it of being a guarantor of impunity rather than punishment for AUC 
members, and was therefore rejected by the Colombian Congress (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 2010).  
More serious and committed legislation followed in 2005 with the creation of Law of 
Peace and Justice (Law 975) which focused on armed group demobilization and reparation for 
victims. Just like in the 1980s, certain legal benefits were promised to members of armed groups 
“in exchange for their assumption of these and other obligations” (Summers, 2012: 224). 
However, the process of reparation required victims to step forward and report the crime, a 
process that was faced with fear by most victims. In the three years after the implementation of 
Law 975, only 24 victims had received damage payments (Summers, 2012). 
A group of victims’ organizations filed a case at the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
leading the court to rule the unconstitutionality of certain aspects of the law. Due to the 
consequential shift in interpretation and implementation of the law, some paramilitary leaders 
decided to withdraw from the demobilization process. In order to continue the peace process, the 
government issued two decrees to maintain the original TJ framework, despite broad protests. 
Local civil society, international organizations, NGOs and even the Colombian Constitutional 
Court pressured to reform the law, which was said to have failed to address the displacement 
problem.  
The peace process continued and in 2007 President Uribe declared that the phenomenon 
of paramilitaries had concluded in Colombia. It is therefore stressed by the government that the 
newly emerged groups should be treated as groups of organized crime, awakening a discussion 
between the government, civil society and international organizations on whether these newly 
emerged groups should be classified as paramilitary. President Uribe’s administration discussed 
the conflict as a war on terror and therefore did not reference the internal armed conflict. 
However, with President Santos’ election, the discourse about the conflict changed to that of an 
internal armed conflict and a discussion within international humanitarian law as well as human 
rights (Villegas, 2014). 
The Victim’s Law of 2011 (law 1448) signed by President Santos passed in June 2011. 
The Law was enabled during a time of growing pressure from international human rights groups 
and the Constitutional Court. The Law addresses the rights of all victims “to damages, restitution 
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of prior living conditions, a range of social services and special protections in legal 
proceedings” (Summers 2012: 225).  
 
3.2 Victims’ Law of 2011 (The Law; Law 1448; Victims and Land Restitution Law) 
As mentioned above, the Victims’ Law, so far, has been the most important legislative 
decision to address the rights of victims. Aiming to promote justice, truth and reparations, Law 
1448 reemphasized the structures of Transitional Justice in Colombia. Importantly, the law 
addresses the rights of all victims, including those that have been murdered or disappeared and 
creates a specific framework to address the rights of displaced persons. Just as important is the 
law’s recognition of the existence of guerrillas, paramilitaries, gender differentials and the 
internal armed conflict (ABColombia, 2011). By acknowledging the internal armed conflict, 
Colombia has afforded the protection of international humanitarian law to its people (Amnesty 
International, 2012).   
Law 1448 has included many provisions that have been acknowledged as positive by 
international organizations, including a foundation for women and children that are survivors of 
abuse as well as those that have been or are targeted because of their sexual orientation. The law 
also recognizes the importance of protecting the victims in the process of and after getting their 
land back - a point that has been missing from earlier provisions (AI, 2012).  
The law, while a positive step forward, has been criticized on the basis of many loopholes 
that exclude some victims and fail to protect others. For example, reparations are offered to 
victims from 1985, while land restitution is offered only for victims from 1991 and on, excluding 
six years of victims that should have the right to land restitution. In addition, those that have 
been accused of being members of illegal armed groups are also excluded from reparations, 
encouraging the method of false positives killing (ABColombia, 2011). Simultaneously, Law 
1448 implies the non-existence of illegal armed groups; consequently, victims of current or 
future abuses, even though the abuses are carried out by still-operating paramilitaries and/or 
guerillas, will be considered as victims of bandas criminales6 (BACRIM) and therefore will not 
qualify for reparations of any kind (ABColombia, 2012).  
                                                
6 English translation: Criminal gangs 
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Another core problem is concerned with the lack of government control in remote areas. 
As a result of weak governance, areas to which victims return are often targeted by the 
perpetrators. In fact, between January 2012 and September 2013, the government relocated 90 
reclaimed land plots to different areas because they could not guarantee safety in a particular 
location. Although the government offers material protection, such as bulletproof vests, for many 
victims the risk of gaining back their land is too high (HRW, 2013). However, this type of 
material protection is not enough and “bulletproof vests and bodyguards won’t solve the 
problem. Meaningful protection will require holding the attackers accountable, and breaking the 
grip paramilitary mafias still have in areas where displaced families are trying to return” 
(Vivanco as cited in HRW, 2013). Making justice claims continues to be a dangerous act and 
more than 20 victims have been killed in the process of claiming their rights (García-Godos & 
Lid, 2010). In areas of Cesar, Córdoba, Magdalena and Nariño a new paramilitary organization 
has emerged, calling themselves Ejército anti-restitución de Tierras7. Such a public position 
against restitution instills fears in those that aim to claim back their land (HRW, 2013; 
ABColombia, 2012). 
 
3.3 Legal Framework for Peace (2012) (Legislative Act #1/12) 
Half of a year after the implementation of Law 1448, the Colombian Congress amended the 
constitution through the Legal Framework for Peace (Isa, 2013). This framework allowed for the 
inclusion of Transitional Justice in the Colombian Constitution (Villegas, 2014). The bill was 
passed in order to negotiate a solution to the armed conflict, however, many are concerned that it 
will simply lead to great impunity (Dodwell, 2012). By writing Transitional Justice into the 
constitution, the prioritization of certain crimes over others and the selection of only some crimes 
for investigation became possible. This amendment to the normal legal proceedings is to be 
applied to members of armed groups that agreed to demobilize and to state officials that have 
committed crimes during the armed conflict (ibid). The framework also establishes different 
treatment for the different groups in questions - that is, state officials, paramilitaries and 
guerrillas will be treated according to different standards and proceedings (Isa, 2013). It also 
expanded military jurisdiction to allow the military to prosecute some crimes that have been 
                                                
7 English translation: Army Against the Restitution of Land 
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committed by members of the armed forces (ibid).  Overall, the Legal Framework for Peace was 
highly criticized for making space and creating the conditions for impunity. At the same time, it 
was blamed for putting efforts of justice aside completely in order to achieve peace (HRW, 
2012).  
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4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following section reviews the academic discussion about Transitional Justice in Colombia. 
The first part will introduce the field of TJ and facilitate our use of it as a concept. This is 
followed by a review of literature concerning the use of TJ in Colombia. Deriving from this, the 
contribution of this study to the academic discussion will be outlined. 
  
4.1 What is Transitional Justice? 
Transitional Justice (TJ) is a relatively new field of study and practice that emerged in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (ICTJ, 2009) in response to changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
that exposed many dilemmas concerning periods of transition. The name emerged from its 
applications to countries that were in a ‘transition to democracy’ at the time, such as Argentina, 
Uganda, Uruguay and a number of others and was first coined in 1995 (Arthur 2009; Villalba, 
2011). Democracy plays an important role in the definition of TJ; in fact, the ‘transition’ in cases 
where Transitional Justice has been applied has almost always been one of moving away from 
the politics of the radical left (Arthur, 2009). The International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) defines it as “a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights [which] 
seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy” (ICTJ 2009: 1). Simultaneously, the UN defines it as “the full set of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Annan, 
2004: 1 as cited in Villalba, 2011: 3). Transitional Justice, as we know it today, is a field that is 
shaped and reshaped by current dilemmas and discussion between human rights activists, policy 
makers, lawyers and legal scholars as well as other actors and is considered to be “one of the 
peacebuilding steps that needs to be taken to secure a stable democratic future” (Villalba, 2011: 
1; Arthur 2009). 
Transitional Justice is a process, rather than a point in time or a final destination, and is 
composed of different elements of focus that are customized individually to each nation’s needs. 
Although each case in which Transitional Justice is applied is unique, the following key 
initiatives are the core of Transitional Justice: criminal prosecutions; truth commissions; 
reparations programs; gender justice; security system reform and memorialization efforts (ICTJ, 
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2009). These focal points make up the basic outline of Transitional Justice. Criminal 
prosecutions convict those who have committed human rights violations; truth commissions 
investigate recent abuses to stop them from repeating; reparations programs focus on 
compensating moral and material damage; initiatives focusing on gender justice investigate cases 
of sexual or gender-based violence; efforts of security system reform focus on the military, 
police and judiciary institutions and memorialization initiatives make sure that the memory of 
the conflict is preserved, rather than erased and that people are aware of past abuses and are 
discouraged from repeating them (ICTJ, 2009).  
Villaba simplifies these steps into four processes of TJ. First of all is the justice process 
which punishes the perpetrators. The justice process is based primarily on international human 
rights laws, international criminal laws and agreements in various international conventions.  The 
justice process in Transitional Justice is often challenged on the basis that it may prevent the 
achievement of peace, truth or reconciliation. For those who believe that the justice element in 
TJ can be an obstacle, peace is the element that has to be sought first “even at the expense of 
justice” (Villalba, 2011: 5).  
Reparation process is the next element of TJ, according to Villalba, and it compensates 
the victims. The reparation process is also grounded in international law. It states that any state 
that breaks its international obligations has the obligation to produce reparation. International 
law also recognizes the responsibilities of individuals that commit violations that can be 
considered as crimes against humanity. They are also obligated to provide necessary reparations 
to their victims. However, while international law covers the obligations of states and individuals 
in crimes against humanity, it leaves a gap for other entities, such as corporations. Therefore, 
indirectly, Transitional Justice processes also fail to bring punishment to corporations who might 
be at fault (Villalba, 2011). In some cases, reparations work against justice. In Colombia, the 
government issued the Administrative Reparations Program “so that the state could provide 
reparations to victims (...) committed by the guerrillas or paramilitary groups (not state forces) 
before 22 April 2008” (Villalba, 2011: 6). By doing so, the state failed to acknowledge the 
perpetrators’ legal responsibilities. The reparation process is still something that is being 
discussed and created right now, because there are several complex issues that have no easy 
answers. These include, for example: how to guarantee victims have received adequate 
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reparation; how harm can be calculated in economic terms and what is appropriate compensation 
for a disappearance, torture or genocide (ibid). 
The truth process of TJ aims to uncover the true proceedings of events. During times of 
conflict, most atrocities are committed in secrecy. Therefore, there is a fundamental need to 
clarify the truth. Truth-telling is a procedure that is strongly supported by international law, 
however, there are very few legislations about truth telling in relation to human rights violations 
other than disappearances. A relevant discussion about TJ’s truth process is that of who needs to 
know the truth. Is it only the victims and their families or does the whole society deserve to 
know about all atrocities? The truth process is highly dependent on the justice process, because 
if the state does not fulfill its obligation to prosecute, there will be no truth to share. Most 
commonly, the truth process is carried out through truth and reconciliation commissions, which 
are created by the state. In different cases, these commissions have varying degrees of power. 
While in some nations they are limited to, for example, investigating disappearances, in other 
nations the also have the power to have public hearings and grant amnesties (Villalba, 2011). 
Lastly is the institutional reform process with sets up an institutional framework to 
prevent such atrocities from happening again (ibid).  Institutional reform is closely associated 
with the guarantee of non-repetition and is an essential part of Transitional Justice. This process 
not only sets up a new institutional framework, but also investigates the faults of old structures 
that made these atrocities possible. It especially focuses on faults and transformations within the 
justice and security frameworks, such as the military personnel, customs, police and other non-
state actors. It goes as far as to provide further education for those employed in security and 
justice fields (Villalba, 2011). 
According to Teitel “[t]ransitional justice implies a non-linear approach to time,” 
(Teitel, 2003: 86) meaning that the interest in finding the truth and reaching justice does not 
diminish as time passes. In some cases, changes in the political situation of a nation can bring 
many testimonies, confessions and requests to the surface, as was the case in Argentina where 
confessions started coming in twenty years after the junta rule ended. At the same time, 
Transitional Justice allows for history to be adjusted. It is a well-known fact that history is 
written by the victors, however, while history cannot be undone, TJ makes space for counter-
histories and an inclusion of other perspectives (Teitel, 2003).  
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While addressing all of these points, Transitional Justice is simultaneously aware of the 
effects of its procedures on the government of the nation in question. A key point of Transitional 
Justice is to enforce and support peace and democracy while aiming for justice, meaning that all 
actions initiated by TJ procedures must be considerate of the effect they might have on the 
stability and credibility of the emerging government. 
  
4.2 Transitional Justice Efforts in Colombia 
Colombia’s Transitional Justice project began with the implementation of the Law of Justice and 
Peace (Law 975) in 2005. This was the first step by the government to show commitment to 
reducing the conflict and protecting victims’ rights (Summers, 2014). Whereas former DDR 
programs had an emphasis on military and security objectives, Law 975 represented a shift 
towards Transitional Justice issues as memory, truth, justice, redress and reconciliation (Laplante 
& Theidon, 2007). In practical terms, the law initiated a demobilization of combatants and 
opened up for victims’ reparations within a united legal framework. The law offered former 
combatants reduced penalties in exchange for their contribution to determining ‘the truth’ of the 
conflict (Summers, 2014). This marked the beginning of an “[i]nnovative case study: brokering 
peace through transitional justice mechanisms and staging a transition in the absence of peace 
accords—indeed, in the midst of war” (Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 52). 
Some claim that the Colombian case has succeeded exactly in this – proving it possible to 
speak of about Transitional Justice and victims’ rights, even in an ongoing conflict (García-
Godos & Lid, 2010). The implementation of Law 975 allowed the category of victims and 
victims’ rights to flourish freely and legitimately in society. This has led to a rhetorical change 
opening up for the formulation of legal and moral claims, not only in state institutions but also in 
civil society, which can be seen by the increase in victims’ organizations (Garcia-Godos & Lid, 
2010). Placing victims’ rights at the center of the peace agenda also shows that the Colombian 
government has been forced to recognize international legal standards (Uprimny & Saffon, n.d.). 
Transitional Justice efforts, however, always face the dilemma of balancing truth and justice, 
accountability and impunity, retribution and forgiveness, and material and symbolic reparations 
(Laplante & Theidon, 2007).  
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The increase in human rights organizations and victims’ movements widely engaged and 
informed about Transitional Justice standards, has put the Colombian government in the 
dilemma of how much it is “willing and able to cede to the paramilitaries while still remaining 
faithful to international jurisprudence and norms, as well as responding to the demands of a 
growing victim survivors’ movement that is well-versed in the transitional justice thinking that 
has emerged over the last twenty-five years” (Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 52). 
It has been pointed out that even though Law 975 was generous in its intentions, it failed 
in providing the necessary mechanisms for assuring the rights it promised. While the law opened 
up for victims’ reparations, it made the process so complicated and let it rest on such weak 
mechanisms that very few victims were able to go through the process. The most severe of 
obstacles to reach these goals has been to guarantee the security of victims. Despite promises of 
security measures, it is hard to see how the state should gain control over areas that have been 
controlled by armed groups for more than 40 years (Summers, 2014). The law also failed to 
protect victims from allied business and paramilitary groups and has not provided the necessary 
truth seeking for reparations. Consequences have been inadequate reparations and drawn-out 
legal processes (ibid). 
Simultaneously to establishing the framework for former combatants to confess to their 
crimes and be sentenced on one side, Law 975 also guaranteed victims the right to know the truth 
on the other, with the creation of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation. 
Vanegas (2009) explains how Colombia has a practice of setting up truth-like commissions but 
not holding perpetrators accountable8. This view is strongly criticized for relying on the false 
assumption that amnesties and forgetting are the most appropriate and effective ways of 
achieving peace in Colombia. Vanegas alludes that these perspectives undermine the importance 
of truth and justice in peace talks. These false perspectives, in combination with the fragile 
character of democratic governance in Colombia, create a necessity for international involvement 
in order to ensure the due prosecution of perpetrators of grave human rights violations (ibid). 
This perspective is supported by the view that punishment of atrocities is an important part of 
fostering national reconciliation. Amnesties tend to be misunderstood in Transitional Justice 
efforts, due to the dilemma of finding equilibrium between justice and peace requirements 
                                                
8 Besides the current peace negotiations, Vanegas refers to the reconciliation commission created after the period of 
La Violencia together with the political decision to a blanket amnesty as well as the blanket amnesty granted the 
guerrilla group M-19 as part of a peace agreement. 
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(Uprimny & Saffon, n.d.). It is, however, impossible to reach equilibrium if either of these 
elements is prioritized over the other. Uprimny & Saffon (n.d.) propose a formula of TJ in which 
punishment is the rule and amnesties the exception. This is dubbed the responsibilizing pardons 
model, in which pardons are used exclusively when it is the only mechanism to obtain peace and 
national reconciliation. Furthermore, it is evaluated against the proportionality of the crime, the 
rank of the perpetrator and his/her contribution to peace (Uprimny & Saffon, n.d.). Nevertheless 
the Colombian government continues to rely on amnesties. It is therefore suggested that the 
International Criminal Court should intervene if Colombia proves unwilling or unable to provide 
justice for the victims of the armed conflict, which the government tends to neglect (Vanegas, 
2009). 
         In this context it might seem that the Colombian government has been “more interested 
in defending the reputation of the armed forces than searching for truth and justice” (Wood, 
2009: 4). Wood (2009) provides the example of the false positives scandal in 2008. False 
positives is the killing of innocent civilians and falsely representing them as enemy combatants, 
and is primarily motivated by a desire to demonstrate positive results and gain rewards from 
superiors. Traditional false positives can, however, be distinguished from the killing of peasants 
suspected to have affiliations and later presenting them as enemy combatants.  This is a different 
type of false positives as it benefitted the state, as suspects were eliminated without the risk of 
human rights litigations. Wood (2009) argues that the former government imposed a system 
incentivizing such actions. An example of this was former Minister of Defense Camilo Ospina 
offering large monetary payments for killed enemy combatants. Until the scandal in 2008, the 
government had failed to recognize the extensiveness of this practice, downplaying justice calls 
as propaganda for the FARC (ibid). 
Rhetoric of Transitional Justice does, therefore, not necessarily mean that justice is being 
assured. Transitional Justice is not merely a legal phenomenon. An analysis of TJ should thus be 
an analysis of the cultural and political context that shapes what is legally and socially possible 
(Laplante & Theidon, 2007). Approaching a peace process with Transitional Justice bears the 
risk of limiting justice demands for the sake of peace and stability (Uprimny & Saffon, 2007). 
Some political actors might invoke in a Transitional Justice discourse in order to secure 
impunity. It is possible to distinguish between a manipulative and a democratic use of 
Transitional Justice (ibid). A manipulative use of TJ serves the objective of securing impunity. 
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These efforts will seek to preserve unequal power relations rather than transforming them, and 
political considerations will outshine the juridical content of TJ. Victims’ rights and justice 
claims are regarded obstacles to peace and stability and secondary to this. A democratic use, in 
contrast, serves the objective of preventing impunity. It lays emphasis on victims’ rights to 
justice, truth, reparation and the guarantee of non-repetition. It believes that peace cannot be 
obtained if justice demands are not met. Rather than being an obstacle, constraints of justice 
facilitate the interests of different actors to come closer (ibid). Uprimny & Saffon (2007) argue 
that Transitional Justice has been used manipulatively in the Colombian case. The rhetoric of 
victims’ rights has proven ineffective and instrumental to hide impunity. Uprimny & Saffon 
(n.d.) therefore stress the importance of the transitional process being democratic. The current 
process can, however, never be successful as armed actors continue to influence political 
elections through violence and threats. It is therefore hard to imagine a true democratic 
transitional process. There will only be a genuine transition if the deep-seated power structures 
produced by these illegal ties and complicities are dissolved (ibid). Demobilization is no 
guarantee of transition, “[i]t is also necessary to dismount large political and economic 
structures, especially the increasingly unequal regime of land ownership caused by the conflict 
and the strong ties between paramilitaries and regional political and economic elites” (Uprimny 
& Saffon, 2007: 1). Furthermore armed actors, which have not engaged in any peace agreements 
with the government continue to exist.  
         A process of Transitional Justice should repair the past and establish a just and peaceful 
future. Even though the Victims’ law from 2011 (Law 1448) does both, the ongoing conflict 
impedes deep engagement with either (Summers, 2014). Success will therefore depend on 
whether the Colombian government will be able to regain control of the land (ibid). 
Deriving from this academic discussion, it can be observed that Transitional Justice 
provides valuable tools and mechanisms for facilitating justice claims and assuring victims’ 
reparations. Nevertheless, Transitional Justice rhetoric can be abused and used in 
counterproductive ways to ensure impunity. It is therefore important to create mechanisms 
through which the formula of Transitional Justice suitable for the context can be democratically 
determined. This review furthermore exposes that the central point of the discussion is the 
balance and emphasis on, respectively, justice or peace in Colombia. The discussion, however, 
hardly engages in the elements of justice. In order to gain a wider understand of the ‘what’, 
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‘who’ and ‘how’ of Transitional Justice in Colombia, this study adopts the following theoretical 
framework. 
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5.0 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Philosophy of Science: Critical Theory 
The critical tradition goes back to Kant, Hegel and Marx and Critical Theory is inspired by their 
critical reflections on capitalism and modernity (Delanty & Strydom, 2003). The twentieth 
century Critical Theory institutionalized in the Frankfurt School associated with prominent 
scholars as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas. Critical Theory gained international 
recognition in the context of the ‘positivist dispute’ that led to an increasing acknowledgement of 
different theoretical and methodological approaches to social science. In its early phases, Critical 
Theory was largely occupied with criticizing the positivist separation of metaphysics and 
philosophy from science (Delanty & Strydom, 2003). Critical Theory rejects the basic positivist 
ideas of induction, deduction and verification as well as the criteria of objectivity and value-
freedom. Critical Theorists distinguish themselves from respectively the empirical-analytical and 
the symbolic-interpretative strands of knowledge-production (ibid). In contrast to these 
traditions, Critical Theory regards reality as normative and ideologically deformed, which 
therefore calls for critique (ibid). It relies on the assumptions that social facts are historical and 
can be changed. It is therefore necessary to understand the lived experience of people in context, 
in order to uncover structures in social conditions and patterns of oppression. In this sense, 
knowledge is regarded to be power, as it enables emancipation (Agger, 1991). 
Despite its misleading name, Critical Theory is more a method than it is a general theory 
(Antonio, 1981). A critical social science “is a self-aware and reflective practice, which 
shunning all polarities and dualisms, acknowledges that it forms an inherent part of the 
development of society and hence that the object of study is affected by the social scientist’s 
theory which helps to shape it into a meaningful human necessity” (Delanty & Strydom, 2003: 
211). In this sense, Critical Theory has a constructive character and regards the task of social 
science to create a better society. Criticizing the natural-scientific and cultural-science models 
for neglecting societal conditions, critical theorists seek to establish a basis of knowledge “that is 
not fully empirical, purely ideological or metaphysical” (Antonio, 1981: 332). The totality of 
society is thus its object, which is understood through the historical development of societal 
relationships (Delanty & Strydom, 2003). 
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Critical social analysis proceeds dialectically to detect possibilities of emancipatory 
social change (Adorno, 1969; Antonio, 1981). It rests upon immanent critique, which seeks to 
identify what is – by revealing the contradictions between claim and context. It thus entails two 
critical moments: firstly is goes from ideology to social reality in holding the claimed social 
totality up against historical context, and secondly it goes back from social reality to ideology by 
determining what could be (Antonio, 1981). This immanent analysis can employ both qualitative 
and quantitative methods in order to reach its emancipatory objective (Adorno, 1969). 
  
5.2 A critical understanding of history 
Historical representations tell us how a given X has been represented over time and space, and 
with it its political implications. Thick contextualized descriptions are important in analyzing 
historical representations (Dunn, 2009). History is central to critical social analysis, which 
regards history as dialectic. History as a dialectic process implies its potential of changing. A 
dialectic imagination thus enables the social scientist to look beyond present social facts towards 
the possibility of altering these (Agger, 1991). History is never neutral and neither is the 
historian. Marx expressed this by dividing the society into base – the material foundation of 
society - and superstructure – the world of ideas, and explaining how the base determined the 
superstructure (Moses & Knutsen, 2007). This argument resonates in Critical Theory with its 
emphasis on ‘living conditions’ and context. Critical social analysis takes departure in ‘living 
conditions’ to produce theory, which serves the goal to alter ‘living conditions’. This is 
embodied in the never-ending dialectical process of history: thesis ⇒ antithesis ⇒ synthesis. 
         This study thus uses history as a central element in understanding the ‘lived experience’ 
of Colombians affected by the armed conflict. 
 
5.3 Structure vs. agency 
When making explanations about social phenomena, the scientist inevitably creates an 
understanding of the nature of political actors, which reflect ideas of structure and agency. Hay 
(1995) explains how structure and agency are linked and can enable or constrain one another. For 
example “a social or political structure only exists by virtue of the constraints on, or 
opportunities for, agency that it affects” (Hay, 1995: 189). Whereas structure represents the 
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context of social and political relations, agency is the free will, choices and interests of actors, as 
well as their autonomy to realize intentions. Intentional action is usually motivated by knowledge 
of structures defining the social context (Hay, 1995). Since these conceptions are implicit in 
every explanation of social and/or political actors, it is of great importance is make these implicit 
(ibid). Different positions on structure and agency are closely linked to ontological and 
epistemological positions. Power is a central element to agency, as agency means having the 
power to influence structures constraining action (ibid). 
Critical Theory coincides with the critical realist view on structure and agency. Critical 
realism seeks to go beyond the dualism of structure and agency and explain a dialectic 
relationship between the two. According to this perspective “society is both the ever-present 
condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency” 
(Bhaskar, 1979 cited in Hay, 1995: 199; original emphasis). In this sense, structured settings 
simultaneously constrain and enable actors by defining the range of their agency. Actors are, 
however, seen as reflexive and thus have potential to gain awareness about these structures, and 
transform them through actions (Hay, 1995). Structure and agency are thus interwoven and 
determine the social reality, or what critical theorists would call ‘living conditions’. 
 Critical theory is concerned with the structural oppression of certain groups. In this 
study, the main agent being studied is the Colombian government. It is, however, also important 
to understand the structural contextualization of agents. Hay (1995) explains how “one person's 
agency is another person's structure” (191). This means that, seen from different perspectives, a 
factor can either be structure and agency. For example, the Colombian government is situated 
within an international and national context, which determines the scope of its actions. The 
structure of international law and the international system determine a framework of criteria that 
the Colombian government has to live up to, as for example, human rights standards. This 
constitutes a framework for the agency of the Colombian government. Simultaneously, 
governmental acts create the national political and legal structure constraining and enabling 
citizens’ actions. For example, it determines the range of action in which victims’ of the armed 
conflict in Colombia can make justice claims or the framework within which victims can create. 
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5.4 Choice of Theory 
This study operationalizes Nancy Fraser’s critical theory about justice. While Fraser presents 
quite a general theory of justice, its critical structure provides a useful frame to make normative 
judgments to the use of Transitional Justice in Colombia. As inherent to critical theory, Fraser 
supplies a theoretical framework to comprehend types of injustices in their complexity as well as 
ideal ways to address emancipation. The operationalized definition of justice is used to evaluate 
whether legislation in Colombia provides the necessary framework and institutions for reaching 
justice, as defined by Fraser. She advocates a balance between the three elements in her theory of 
justice: recognition, redistribution and representation. While they are interactive in the physical 
world, it is necessary for the sake of a clearer analysis to abstract “from the complexities of the 
real world” (Fraser, 1997), in order to actively form a conceptual scheme with which to properly 
analyze the issues that are presented with in this study. The analysis therefore employs the theory 
in three steps: first it is split into pieces, and Colombian legislation is put up against each of the 
three elements, described by Fraser; second these parts are reunited and analyzed in their 
complex interdependence; and lastly the analysis is lifted up on a global perspective. 
 
5.5 Qualitative Research 
This study employs a qualitative character in that it seeks to analyze the contribution of a 
framework of Transitional Justice to approaching justice and peace in the Colombian context, in 
which conflict is still ongoing. The primary data analyzed are the laws, and the institutions 
created by these, within the framework of Transitional Justice in Colombia. Secondarily, national 
and international debates about the controversial use of Transitional Justice in Colombia are 
included. In pragmatic terms, this entails a close connection between the primary data and our 
secondary data. This means that the analysis has its foundation in Colombian legislation, with an 
emphasis on the Transitional Justice framework. The analysis furthermore encompasses the 
institutions and mechanisms created by this same legislation in order to understand the 
institutionalization (or lack thereof) of Transitional Justice in Colombia. 
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5.6 Concepts  
The formation of concepts lies at the center of all social research. Without the use of concepts, 
no literature would be able to describe what the essence is - it is essential to put a label on a 
topic. In many cases, a term may have more than one possible interpretation, and in order for it 
to be understood the same way the writer means it, it must be conceptualized (Gerring, 2012).  
The key concept of this study is Transitional Justice - a broad term that can cover a 
judicial field, a field of research, a forum for discussion or a mechanism for rebuilding. All of 
these describe Transitional Justice when it stands alone. This study is using a definition of 
Transitional Justice as defined by the United Nations, which describes TJ as “the full set of 
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation” (Annan, 2004: 1 as cited in Villalba, 2011: 3). It is a set of practices that helps a 
nation answer practical, legal and ethical questions on the way to justice (Arthur, 2009).  
In order to conceptualize the process of Transitional Justice, one must first separate the 
term and shortly look at ‘transition’ and ‘justice’ alone. Because this field emerged as a 
discussion between lawyers, journalists, donors, human rights activists, politics experts and 
scholars from various fields, the term is loaded with various connotations that can contribute to 
misunderstandings. To dissect the composition of the term, one must look at the time of the 
term’s emergence and what was in mind when the term was coined. The term emerged at an 
international level throughout a series of conferences dealing with transitions in the 1980s and 
1990s - always implying a transition to democracy. In connection with the term, a discussions of 
prosecutions, restitutions or reparations, truth-telling and institutional reform always followed. 
Thus, the initial definition of Transitional Justice referred to “something undertaken by 
‘emerging democracies’” (Arthur, 2009: 331). It was something interwoven tightly with political 
problems and legal institutions (Arthur, 2009).  
Following Gerring’s (2012) process of conceptualization, one can call Transitional 
Justice a term, while its attributes are linked to truth-telling, reparation, compensation, justice 
and democracy. Furthermore, Gerring’s method requires one to point out some indicators - 
points “that help to locate the concept in empirical space” (Gerring, 2012: 116). Of this, 
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examples are plenty. Transitional Justice has been applied to: Argentina after the overthrow of a 
dictator; Chile after the 17-year-long repressive police state; El Salvador after years of political 
violence; Peru after two decades of internal conflict; and in South Africa after the system of 
apartheid - and these cases only name a few (ICTJ, 2008). Furthermore, TJ is indicated by truth 
commissions, reconciliation and reparation procedures, and collective memory projects as well 
as by institutional reform. In this study, the concept of Transitional Justice will be 
operationalized by changing several components. One of the key changes is the exclusion of the 
transition to democracy. Colombia’s situation is that of an armed conflict without any change in 
the regime. The second change is that of the timing of Transitional Justice. While traditionally, 
this mechanism is used after a conflict, this study addresses TJ in an ongoing conflict. Thus, the 
definition of TJ is extended to include situations other than those categorized under ‘post-
conflict’. 
 
5.7 Validity 
The validity of a study can be assessed in three dimensions (Bryman, 2012). One of them is the 
measurement validity, which has to do with the issues of the concepts that are used in the 
research model. As accounted for in earlier sections, this study is centralized around the concepts 
of justice and Transitional Justice. The concept of Transitional Justice is reviewed in the 
literature review as well as operationalized in the ‘Concepts’ section in this chapter. The concept 
of justice adopted directly from Nancy Fraser’s framework9. As the definition of justice is a 
comprehensive philosophical discussion, in which this study does not take part, the findings will 
thus only be valid as long as the definition of justice by Nancy Fraser is accepted.   
         Another aspect is the external validity, which refers to the application of this study to 
other contexts (Bryman, 2012). Even though the Colombian case of Transitional Justice is very 
unique due to the context of the ongoing conflict, the framework of this study could be applied to 
any country undergoing a process of transition, in order to understand how justice should be 
approached and whether a (Transitional) Justice framework is or would be effective. It is, 
however, important that the specific context of the geographic entity being studied, is taken into 
account. 
                                                
9 See section 5.4 
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6.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Nancy Fraser provides a critical theory of justice, through which she deconstructs the way in 
which justice is defined and how the concept has been used throughout history. She defines the 
concept as three-dimensional and explains how a wrongful emphasis of just one or two of the 
three dimensions can lead to the creation of injustices, thus defeating the cause.  
Concerns herself with the question of how to frame questions of justice in a globalizing world? 
Fraser explains the general meaning of justice to be parity of participation. She separates 
the concept of justice in three sub-elements: Distribution, recognition and representation. 
Injustice, or obstacles to participatory parity, will likewise be related to these three categories. 
The first category, distribution, has to do with the distribution of material and economic goods. 
The distributive conception relates social justice to the fair allocation of economic goods. 
Distributive injustice is thus explained as economic structures denying individuals or groups the 
resources necessary for participating equally with others in social interaction. While this first 
type of injustice is related to class, the second element - recognition - has to do with status order 
in regards to culture. Injustice would thus be due to institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value 
leading to misrecognition and status inequality (Fraser, 2008). Fraser explains that there has been 
a decline in claims for egalitarian distribution, thanks to the widespread neoliberal grammar and 
lack of a feasible model of socialism. Instead, many of the world’s conflicts are driven by claims 
of recognition (Fraser, 2000). She sees this as problematic due to two problems; first is the 
problem of displacement  explaining how, rather than supplementing redistribution, recognition 
might marginalize and displace redistributive struggles, and second is the problem of reification, 
as recognition struggles tend to reify group identities, thus encouraging separatism rather than 
respectful interaction (ibid). 
The third dimension of justice is political concerning the state's jurisdiction. It relates to 
the structures (dis/)enabling the contestation and struggles over distribution and recognition. The 
political dimension of justice has to do with membership and procedure, determining social 
belonging with its entitlements and procedures of resolving contests. Political injustice will, 
according to this, be refusing people the possibility of participating in political arenas and 
exclusion from the entitlement to do justice claims. Representation is explained as the 
intersection of symbolic framing and political voice. It thus consists of two levels: ordinary 
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political representation, concerning political voice and democratic accountability, and (in)justice 
of boundaries and frames. Ordinary-political misrepresentation refers to the debate about the 
effectiveness of different electoral systems in regards to the just participation and representation 
of all groups. Misframing relies on the assumption that framing bears a great importance in every 
aspect of social justice. This, Fraser calls “the most consequential of political decisions” in that 
it can exclude “those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, 
recognition and ordinary-political representation” (Fraser, 2008: 19). When questions of justice 
are framed in a way that wrongly excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special 
kind of meta-injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first order justice claims in a 
given political community. Misframing arises when “the partitioning of political space block 
some who are poor or despised from challenging the forces that oppress them” (Fraser, 2008: 
147). 
Whereas justice claims were mainly regarding distribution in the postwar period, the 
emphasis shifted to recognition with the emergence of new social movements and 
multiculturalism (ibid). Today globalization has, however, shifted the attention to the frame. 
Fraser stresses that justice theories must be three dimensional. While distribution and recognition 
are only concerned with what Fraser calls first-order questions regarding the ‘what’ and ‘who’ of 
justice, representation also introduces second order meta-level questions regarding the ‘how’ of 
justice (ibid). Even though the politics of framing is basically concerned with questions of the 
‘who’, it can be distinguished in two approaches. Affirmative politics contest the boundaries of 
existing frames while accepting the principles of state-territoriality as the proper basis for the 
‘who’ of justice. Transformative politics, however, argue that the state-territorial principles no 
longer give adequate basis for determining the ‘who’ of justice in regards to structural causes of 
injustices in globalizing world. The transformative approach thus recognizes a meta-political 
level of representation concerning the ‘how’ of justice. This ‘how’ refers to the accepted 
procedures to determining the ‘who’. Fraser explains framing disputes as permanent to the 
political landscape, making necessary spaces and institutions where framing questions can be 
democratically debated and addressed. Meta-political injustices occur when states and 
transnational elites monopolize frame-setting implicating a “[l]ack of institutions where disputes 
about the ‘who’ can be democratically aired and resolved” (Fraser, 2008: 27).  
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Frasier explains how the field of justice has changed due to globalization. While most 
justice claims have been taking the Keynesian-Westphalian frame for granted, modern justice 
claims and movements look beyond the territorial state.  Globalization has led to many problems 
and decisions overflowing territorial borders. These problems cannot be handled by Westphalian 
frames, leading to a questioning of the territorial state as the appropriate unit of justice and its 
citizens as pertinent subjects (Fraser, 2008). For example, redistribution claims now go beyond 
national economies. Likewise, local recognition movements link their struggles to critiques of 
the global system. In this sense, disputes that used to focus on the ‘what’ of justice, are now also 
concerned with ‘who’ counts a relevant subject. In this sense globalization has made the 
misframing form of representation visible. The Keynesian-Westphalian frame is thus considered 
a vehicle of injustice as far as addressing globalized issues of justice, as it shields powerful states 
and transnational private powers from the reach of justice (Fraser, 2008). It is thought to partition 
space in a manner that blocks vulnerable individuals from confronting their oppressing forces. 
Channeling claims of global justice into domestic political areas thus protects transnational 
responsible actors from critique and control. An adequate politics of representation must 
therefore address ordinary-political misrepresentation and misframing, while simultaneously 
aiming to democratize the process of frame-setting. The result is a theory of post-Westphalian 
democratic justice (Fraser, 2008). 
The three dimensions of justice are independent and a group of people can experience 
injustice in just one or two of the three dimensions. However they are also intertwined and tend 
to reinforce one another at times (Fraser, 2008). For example, “[j]ust as the ability to make 
claims for distribution and recognition depends on the relations of representation, so the ability 
to exercise one’s political voice depends on the relations of class and status” (Fraser, 2008: 
165). It thus easily leads to a vicious circle of injustice, in which victims of one type of injustice 
find themselves vulnerable to other types. Efforts to overcome injustice can thus rarely address 
just one of the dimensions. Fraser therefore stresses that struggles for the different dimensions of 
justice can rarely succeed unless they are joined.  
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7.0 ANALYSIS 
The following chapter functions to analyze empirical data with the aim of answering the problem 
formulation proposed by this study. The layout of the analysis will follow the structure of the 
working questions and will be succeeded by the discussion and the conclusion.  
 
7.1 How do Transitional Justice efforts in Colombia approach justice? 
The first part of the analysis will focus on the application of Transitional Justice in Colombia 
before analyzing the consequences of this move in the rest of the analysis. The section splits 
apart the framework of TJ, as implemented in Colombia, and analyzes the approach to justice in 
the terms of Nancy Fraser. 
 
7.1.1 The Beginning of Transit ional Justice in Colombia 
Law 782 from 2002 was the first step in the direction of Transitional Justice in Colombia and 
was implemented to facilitate peace negotiations with the AUC, which was centered on granting 
amnesties to those that were members of illegal armed groups if agreed to cooperate (Garcia-
Godos & Lid, 2010). Up until the implementation of Law 975, the procedures in Colombia 
resembled a DDR program, rather than Transitional Justice. It is Law 975 that “shifted the DDR 
program onto the terrain of transitional justice and its concerns with issues of memory, truth, 
justice, redress and reconciliation” (Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 52). Law 975 introduced the 
basic structures of TJ in Colombia; it provided for the establishment of a truth commission, set 
up a special criminal prosecution commission, and among other policies, it established 
mandatory reparations for victims (Isa, 2013; ICTJ - Colombia Timeline). Furthermore, it 
continued the policy of amnesties and alternative punishments for members of illegal armed 
groups. The law established the opportunity for demobilized combatants to receive alternative 
penalties if they would in turn contribute to the reconstruction of historical truth. These 
alternative penalties ranged from five to eight years - depending on the gravity of the crime 
(D.O., 2005: Art 29). It was followed by a series of scattered mechanisms and efforts to improve 
the conditions for victims - none of which can be considered an integral part of Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ, n.d.). Victim's reparations is explained to comprise of restitution, compensation, 
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rehabilitation, moral compensation and guarantees of non-repetition (D.O., 2005: art. 8). This 
formulation frames the issue as one of victims’ suffering under the abuses and violations on 
behalf of criminals. The ‘who’ of justice is thus the people suffering damages by the actions of 
illegal armed groups. In this sense, the law does not account for governmental responsibility for 
the situation. Justice is therefore mainly referred to criminal punishment of criminals, as a 
structural injustice is not verbalized in the law. 
Law 975 was highly scrutinized by both local and international human rights groups, 
NGOs and the Colombian Constitutional Court (Summers, 2012). Most critique was concerned 
with the lack of a comprehensive reparations process, the prioritization of amnesty over the 
rights of victims and the failure to effectively address the problem of displacement. The latter 
reason was at the core of scrutiny from the UN High Commission for Refugees, NGOs and the 
Constitutional Court. In the following five years, the Court issued three demands for a 
comprehensive land restitution program (ibid.). Even though both, Law 782 and Law 975 used 
the mechanism that one can attribute to Transitional Justice, neither one of these legislations 
used the term. Although the latter law did not directly mention Transitional Justice, “it was 
acknowledged by the state as a transitional justice legal document” (Villegas, 2014: 4). 
However, because Law 975 was passed under the administration of former President Uribe who 
explained the violence as a terrorist threat, the law does not mention the internal armed conflict 
(Villegas, 2014).  
Over the decade since the first step towards Transitional Justice was taken, the policies 
implemented in Colombia show an evident shift of focus from demobilization and military 
tactics to victims’ rights, reparation and integration.  An important shock to the discourse of the 
conflict was a change of administration in 2010, when President Santos was elected in the place 
of former President Uribe. With the change of administration came a change of the perception of 
the conflict. President Santos defined the conflict within the terms of human rights and 
international humanitarian law as an internal armed conflict. This move allowed for the 
application of international humanitarian law, which is the set of laws that regulates armed 
conflict (Villegas, 2014). 
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7.1.2 Current Legislat ion 
The Victims’ Law of 2011 was the legislation that officially announced the beginning of 
Transitional Justice in Colombia and declares that it is founded on a principle of Transitional 
Justice (Summers, 2012). The 2011 Victims’ Law, or Law 1448, which was created to address 
the critiques of law 975, was established “amidst mounting pressure from domestic and 
international human rights groups as well as from the Colombian Constitutional Court” 
(Summers, 2012: 225). This law took the policies several steps further than Law 975 by defining 
the range of victims that it addresses. One of the key points of the law, is that earning the title of 
‘victim’ is completely detached from that of determining the perpetrator. As well as allowing 
more victims to come forward, this also allows for greater security for those who must claim 
reparations (Summers, 2012). Law 1448 defines as a victim “any person who has suffered grave 
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law […] as a result of the conflict since 
1985” (Summers, 2012: 226). The law further defines as victims’ spouses, permanent partners 
and immediate family members of those persons mentioned above. In addition, those who 
suffered harm before 1985 can be considered as victims in regards to seeking the truth, but are 
not eligible for reparations (ibid). Law 1448 also creates a set of organizations and programs for 
victims: a National System for the Attention and Reparation of Victims (D.O., 2011: art. 159), a 
Special Administrative Unit for Assistance and Integral Reparation for Victims (D.O., 2011: art. 
168), which is responsible for the National Plan for Integrated assistance and reparation. The 
National Plan includes an integrated health plan, a program of psychosocial assistance and a 
program of collective reparations for the victims. Furthermore, the National Register of Victims 
(D.O., 2011: art. 154) is also created by this law which is responsible for setting the criteria for 
victims’ compensation (ABColombia, 2012).  
The law puts particular emphasis on the importance of victim participation in the process 
of Transitional Justice. According to the definition of justice by Nancy Fraser, representation, in 
this case shown through participation, is a fundamental element of justice. Article 192 states that 
“it is the responsibility of the state to guarantee the effective participation of victims in the 
design, implementation, execution and the sense of fulfilment of the law (...)” (D.O., 2011: art. 
192, authors’ translation). The law also calls for the creation of panels for discussion in which 
victims and victims’ organizations are actively included and heard (D.O., 2011: art. 193). The 
ability for victims to be heard is an essential step towards achieving representation in the sense of 
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political voice and democratic accountability10. Simultaneously, the UN High Commissioner 
claims that participation of victims is “an essential condition of a human rights-based approach 
and for building a legitimate, sustainable and effective reparations process” (UN High 
Commissioner, 2012 as cited in ABColombia, 2012).  
Another core element of justice is recognition - the awareness and understanding of 
groups and their acceptance into society. Law 1448 incorporates this element through the 
establishment of the Centre of Historical Memory, which is meant to “stimulate collective 
memory” as well as to publicize documents and testimonies of victims to encourage acceptance 
of the conflict (D.O., 2011: art. 148, authors’ translation). By trying to include different 
perspectives of the conflict and different versions of history, initiatives like these reach for 
justice in the form of recognition.  
Shortly after the implementation of Law 1448, the government also outlined a Financial 
Plan for the implementation of the law. The fiscal plan is an essential part of Transitional Justice, 
especially in the outline of justice provided by Nancy Fraser, where distribution - the fair 
allocation of economic goods - is a fundamental step in reaching justice11. For the ten years after 
the implementation of Law 1448, the government has allocated 54 billion Colombian pesos 
(COP), about $30 billion USD, the majority of which will be spent in the areas of assistance and 
reparation measures (ABColombia, 2012). To further reach distributive justice, the Special 
Administrative Unit for the Process of Restitution of Dispossessed Lands was established 
specifically to deal with illegally possessed land (ibid).  
 
7.1.3 The Peace Process 
Parallel with and intertwined with the process of Transitional Justice is the peace process, which 
makes the case of Colombia unique. TJ and the peace process are unavoidably dependent on one 
another; they shape and are shaped by each other. Transitional Justice works to secure peace 
while also aiming for justice and reconciliation, while the peace process works to end the conflict 
in order to enter a true transition (Jaramillo, 2013). The High Commissioner for Peace in 
Colombia states that the end of the conflict will mean “(...) the real beginning of the peace 
process rather than the end” (Jaramillo, 2013: 2). The High Commissioner, with President 
                                                
10 See section 6.0 
11 See section 6.0 
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Santos, have outlined some points that are essential for terminating the conflict. These points are 
also in line with Nancy Fraser’s requirements for reaching justice.  
 Participation is outlined in several contexts in this speech given by the High 
Commissioner. The first mention of participation is in the context of ‘playing on a level field’ 
(Jaramillo, 2013). This form of equality encourages even representation for all groups - this 
includes former members of illegal armed groups. Secondly, participation is used to describe the 
need for agency of the civil society. In accordance with the plea for participation mentioned 
above, Jaramillo agrees that participation in the transition is a core part of a successful rebuilding 
of the nation. However, he clearly outlines that “to gain the right to participate in the transition, 
weapons will first have to be abandoned” (2013: 5).  
 The recognition of the conflict makes up another large part of the road to peace. Jaramillo 
claims that a problem cannot be solved if it is not called by its proper name. In this case, the 
conflict needs to be recognized as an internal armed conflict and nothing else. By doing this, not 
only is the nation entitled to the laws of international humanitarian law, but it is also recognized 
by other states as a nation needing help. Creating a favorable international setting where the 
region supports the state’s actions is an important process in paving the way for peace (ibid). 
Furthermore, the victims of the conflict need to be recognized not only as victims, but also as 
citizens with rights (OACP, 2014). However, recognition also includes the recognition of all 
actors of the conflict and not only the victims (ibid).  
 Overall, “the Government’s vision of peace is centered on rights and on a territorial 
approach” (Jaramillo, 2014). Rights are discussed not only as the rights of victims, but as the 
general focus on equality, access to resources, and tolerance for all citizens. The territorial 
approach is included in the vision of peace because the consequences of the conflict are much 
more evident in some areas in relation to others. At the same time, the territorial approach is also 
important in order to be able to mobilize the rural regions and encourage them to participate in 
this process (ibid). Rural and urban regions experience the conflict differently, “a situation made 
possible by the great differences between urban contexts and the countryside and between 
geographical regions that are characterized by distinct economic, social and cultural traits” 
(Vidal-Lopez, 2012: 5).  
 The approach of Transitional Justice in Colombia began over a decade ago with the 
installment of Law 782. Since then, in accordance with national and international critique, it has 
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increasingly put victims as the focal point of the process. Law 1448, the driving mechanism of 
TJ in Colombia today, has set up a legal and institutional framework meant to guide the 
reparation and reconciliation process, has circumscribed the definition of victimhood and has 
shifted the legal proceedings in the favor of the victims. However, the law does not come without 
any fallbacks. The following section of the analysis will consider how this Transitional Justice 
framework can, in contradiction, lead to injustice, as defined by Nancy Fraser.  
 
7.2 In which sense can Transitional Justice efforts be seen to cause injustices in 
Colombia? 
Deriving from the legislative history outlined in the contextualization chapter in this study, it is 
seen that the implementation of a framework of Transitional Justice in Colombia has been a slow 
and deliberate process with the ambitious goal of reaching peace while assuring justice 
simultaneously. This framework has been widely debated12 and it has been questioned whether it 
does more harm than good. While most agree with the positive aspects of the framework, most 
disapprovals are concerned with the side effects it causes. 
This section will scrutinize the implications of TJ efforts in Colombia. The theoretical 
framework of Nancy Fraser is used to understand how the approach to justice in Colombia could 
lead to injustices due to a skewness in its focus. The analysis builds upon the outline of the 
elements and mechanisms created by the Transitional Justice legislation in the previous section13. 
It seeks to go deeper and understand the consequences of the ways in which the Colombian TJ 
model approaches justice and the ways in which this could lead to certain elements of injustice as 
a repercussion. Advances between the different laws are highlighted and interpreted within the 
justice framework of Nancy Fraser.  
 
7.2.1 The Beginning Phase of Transit ional Justice  
The law 975 sought to address peace negotiations and victims’ reparations very closely in the 
legal framework. Through this framework, demobilized combatants were offered alternative 
penalties of five to eight years in change of contributing to establishing the truth of events. Even 
though this law made progress in establishing the rights of victims, especially in regards to the 
                                                
12 See section 4.0 
13 See section 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 
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right to the truth, one can say it put the responsibility of reconstructing the historical truth in the 
hands of the perpetrators. This left very little space for participation of victims in the writing of 
their proper history (Romero, 2012). This implies a lack of ordinary-political representation, as 
defined by Nancy Fraser, since the victims are deprived of their political voice in establishing the 
truth of the conflict. Furthermore, Law 975 does not mention the armed conflict and solely refers 
to victims of “armed groups at the margin of the law” (D.O., 2005: art. 1, authors’ translation). 
This reflects the general attitude of former President Uribe’s administration, which failed to 
recognize the existence of an armed conflict in such. Instead, it regarded the guerrillas to be 
terrorist groups, posing a considerable threat to society. By doing so, the government denied 
recognition of the political objectives of the guerrillas, as well as the extensiveness of the 
conflict. Rather than exposing the complexity of the conflict which is composed of economic, 
cultural and social factors, it was explained as being purely a fight for land and resources. This is 
a sign of vulgar economism as it displaces politics of recognition for the politics of distribution 
(Fraser, 2000). At the same time, this can be explained as being as disturbing as vulgar 
culturalism, as it tends to reify cultural separatism and promote economic inequality. Instead 
struggles for redistribution should be merged with struggles for recognition (ibid).  
This, however, changed with the change in administration. With the administration of 
President Santos, the Colombian government has finally acknowledged the existence of the 
internal armed conflict14. This was a big advance as it changed the rhetoric and legitimized 
speech as well as justice claims. Furthermore, it recognized the guerrillas as more than criminal 
groups, and thereby opened up for negotiation about social factors motivating their organization 
in the first place. A need for this can be seen in the fact that only 24 victims received reparations 
within the first three years after the implementation of Law 975. It should, however, not be 
underplayed that the law laid the foundation for Transitional Justice in Colombia and created a 
legal framework for the official recognition of victims’ rights.  
 
                                                
14 In law 1448 victims’ are defined as those that have suffered damages to their human rights’ in the context of the 
internal armed conflict (D.O., 2011: art. 3). 
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7.2.2 Opening Up for Land Restitut ion 
As explained in earlier chapter, the Law 1448 was the official implementation15 of Transitional 
Justice in Colombia. Apart from the wider definition of victim, it had several improvements in 
comparison to Law 975 due to national and international criticism. Apart from focusing on 
victims’ rights, the law has a special emphasis on the millions of forcefully displaced in 
Colombia. An advance in regards to this is the introduction of mechanisms for returning land to 
dispossessed and displaced people. Many obstacles have, however, been linked to this process. 
First of all, the mechanisms designed for the restitution of land are very complex and few victims 
live up to all of the criteria. For example, article 207 states that victims can be denied the right to 
land restitution, if they participate in peaceful protests in which land is trespassed, before a 
verdict on the restitution case relies (D.O., 2011). This not only denies people a basic human 
right on the basis of being criminals, which is against international human rights standards, but it 
also criminalizes the act of protesting (AI, 2012). Furthermore, one of the requirements in the 
land restitution process is being able to show documents proving original ownership. However, 
many victims do not have the access to these papers either because they lost or left them in the 
process of their displacement or because they simply did not have any formal papers. The latter 
is often the case for indigenous communities and peoples, who are therefore further hindered 
from getting land restitution. This is a very clear example of misrecognition due to 
institutionalized cultural values, making legal processes harder for some groups than others, 
implying status inequality.  
 Several gaps have been found in the law, through which victims fall through and fail to 
be recognized as such. Among other victims not considered, are victims of paramilitary activities 
after the official declaration that the phenomena has concluded in Colombia. Since the 
demobilization efforts the government denies the continuous existence of paramilitaries and 
categorize the ‘new generation of paramilitaries’ as regular groups of organized crime16. As Law 
1448 does not include victims of regular crime, these victims do however not have the same right 
to reparations and are not considered victims of the armed conflict. Another exclusion is in 
regards to children and adolescents having been forcefully recruited, as they are only considered 
victims if they are still minors at the time of demobilization (D.O., 2011: art. 2). 
                                                
15 It was until law 1448, that Transitional Justice is literally mentioned as a framework for the law (Summers, 2014). 
Elements of TJ were present in law 975, this was, however, not verbalized as such. 
16 This claim is further discussed in section 8.0 
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The law furthermore creates a hierarchy of victims: victims who have been displaced 
before 1985 only receive symbolic reparations; victims displaced between 1985 and 1991 can get 
economic reparations but no land restitutions; and only displaced from 1991 onwards have the 
right to land restitutions - with the condition that they are officially recognized as displaced. 
Nevertheless the law only takes into account 2 million hectares of land, while other international 
and civil society organizations believe the amount of dispossessed land to be as high as 6.8 
million hectares (ABColombia, 2012). This is partially due the fact that people who have left 
their lands because of violence in the area or because their crops got destroyed by aerial 
fumigation17 are not recognized as having been forcefully displaced (ibid). Even when victims 
have succeed in going through this process and regaining control of their land, it does not mean 
they have the full right to the use of it. The law benefits people who have acquired dispossessed 
land in ‘good faith’. If, for example, agro-industrial businesses have developed in ‘good faith’ on 
dispossessed lands, these are not obligated to give up the land and can continue by paying rent to 
the original owner (ibid). In this sense it has been claimed that law 1448 legalizes the use of 
illegally occupied land (ABColombia, 2011). 
It has been questioned whether the land favors owners of mega-projects in dispossessed 
lands over the victims. First of all, many peasants go bankrupt after gaining back their land, since 
they are not exempt from new tax regulations and previous debts, and therefore often have to sell 
it to the new owners. Furthermore, victims are stressed to cooperate with mega-projects rather 
than developing their own agricultural business (AI, 2012); in fact, if dispossessed land is now 
being used for agro-industrial production, the victim will not receive the land unless he or she 
agrees to become an ‘associate’ of the company that is in charge of the production 
(ABColombia, 2012). The law also establishes that victims who voluntarily decide not to 
proceed with the land restitution claim receive a monetary bonus, which is larger than the 
monetary compensation they might receive if they do not gain back ownership over their land 
(D.O., 2011: art. 132). This defies the cause of the Victims and Land Restitutions law of 
reaching distributive justice, as the economic structures deny them the right to participate on par 
with others in social life.  
Generally, the Transitional Justice framework in Colombia refers to justice on the level of 
first-order questions regarding the ‘what’ and the ‘who’. That is - questions of what is owed, 
                                                
17 An account of the practice of aerial fumigations and is consequences is given in the next section (WQ 3) 
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what counts as a matter of justice, who counts as a member and a subject of justice. The Centre 
of Historical Memory, created within the framework of law 144818 is the aspect of the 
Colombian framework that gets closest to addressing the framing element of justice. The 
mandate of the Center emphasizes the inclusion of victims’ perspectives as well of those of civil 
society (D.O., 2011: art. 145). This shows a significant advance of the law 1448 in comparison to 
law 975, which relied on former combatants to reconstruct the historical truth. The creation of 
the Centre opens up for a wider participation and inclusion of perspectives into the writing of 
collective memory. This opens slightly up for the democratic institutions, referred to by Nancy 
Fraser19, as necessary for debating framing questions. The Centre for Historical Memory, 
however, only provides for participation in the reconstruction of history as a symbolic reparation. 
Fraser explains these institutions of framing as necessary to democratically debate the accepted 
procedures to determining the ‘who’ of justice. She calls this the ‘how’ of justice which 
questions the proper frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice. 
 Even though Transitional Justice, as a legal framework in Colombia, has provided many 
valuable mechanisms as well as rhetorical tools for ensuring justice to the victims’ of the 
conflict, the adoption of it at this point in time can give the impression that the conflict has ended 
- even though it has not. While the law 1448 is to be appraised for providing mechanisms of 
reparations, it also excludes victims of present and future abuses of the legislation. The unequal 
balance of the three dimensions of justice fails to overcome injustice, as all three dimensions 
have to be joined to do so. The large emphasis on distributive justice also leads to a disregard of 
recognitional and representational injustices. As these reinforce each other in a vicious circle 
(Fraser, 2008), no type of justice can be reached unless questions of framing and cultural values 
in institutions are included equally in justice debates.  
 
7.3 How can the Westphalian framework of justice be limiting to the case of 
Colombia? 
Nancy Fraser explains how a Westphalian frame of justice works as a powerful instrument of 
injustice in a globalized world, in which few issues are purely domestic20. As explained in the 
                                                
18 See previous section for an elaboration of the mandate and function of the Centre for Historical Memory 
19 These democratic institutions are accounted for in the theory section 
20 See section 6.0 
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previous parts of the analysis, the Colombian framework of Transitional Justice has provided a 
framework within which national perpetrators of human rights abuses and crimes can be 
prosecuted and victims have legal rights to receive compensation. In this section, the aspect of 
state-territoriality in TJ is reviewed for the Colombian context. The involvement of transnational 
and foreign actors in the conflict is analyzed in order to understand the degree to which the 
Westphalian frame might be limiting for development of justice in the case of Colombia. 
A common critique of international law in its approach to human rights is, as stated by 
Kronforst, “[i]nternational law, which defines human rights, lays out codes of conduct that 
should be followed by states, not corporations” (Kronforst, 2012: 4). This is, in essence, relevant 
to TJ, which also neglects the role of TNCs as contributors to atrocities (Sandoval, 2011). This is 
not any different in Colombia where, in most cases, TNCs are protected by both political power 
and pure financial wealth, both of which hold considerable weight in a developing state such as 
Colombia.   
 
7.3.1 Corporate Interests in Confl ict 
Numerous examples have shown that TNCs and other private actors tend to exacerbate conflict 
and affect local populations negatively in zones of conflict (Banfield, Haufler & Lilly, 2003). 
These might be inclined to expand into conflict-prone areas as it opens up for beneficiary 
agreements in regards to environment, labor and security autonomy. Governments in these areas 
are often anxious for foreign investments, leading them to be more flexible in negotiations, thus 
granting foreign investors more freedom. In Colombia, several foreign companies have been 
accused of contributing to illegal land acquisitions and collaborations with armed groups.  
The largest revelations about foreign companies collaborating with actors of the armed 
conflict have been about two U.S. firms: the banana brand Chiquita and the coal-mining 
company Drummond. It has been revealed that the two companies paid at least 3.2 million 
dollars to leaders of paramilitary groups in Colombia between 1997 and 2006 (Grecko, 2011). 
These companies have financed and supported paramilitaries for security services, protection 
from guerilla attacks and for oppressing labor unions. While the banana producer has been linked 
to the illegal trafficking of thousands of arms and ammunition to the AUC, the mining company 
has, among other crimes, been accused for being an accomplice in the killings of three leaders of 
the company’s labor union (ibid). In 2007, the brand Chiquita signed a plea agreement with the 
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U.S. Justice Department and had to pay a 25 million dollar fine for giving money to 
paramilitaries (Lobe & Muscara, 2011). In this sense, the Chiquita brand got away with a 
corporate slap on the wrist, while none of its direct or indirect victims received reparations. 
These two firms are, however, not alone on the list of companies having strengthened and 
prolonged the armed conflict in Colombia. Several other international companies have been 
associated with the paramilitaries. 
The Coca-Cola Company was accused of having paid paramilitaries for killing members 
of its labor union, which has been the most affected union in Colombia in regards to killings 
(Brodzinsky, 2003). This led labor unions all over the world to call for a boycott of Coca-Cola 
products. Around this time, Colombia was the most dangerous country in the world to be a 
unionist (ibid). This can be seen by the drop of union workers from 1300 in 1993 to 450 in 2001, 
which led to the sad fact that “[Colombia was] the murder capital of the world of union 
organizers” (Kronforst, 2012: 8). A lawsuit was filed with a subsidiary of Coca Cola, which 
allegedly disassociated itself from the subsidiary in question, portraying tactics which are quite 
common in lawsuits with TNCs. Specifically, the subsidiary “contracted with or otherwise 
directed paramilitary security forces that utilized extreme violence and murdered, tortured, 
unlawfully detained or otherwise silenced trade union leaders” (Ferero, 2001). This is not the 
only case of abuse at the hands of a TNCs, but one of the few which has had successful media 
coverage and has been brought into light. 
British Petroleum (BP) is the largest investor in Colombia, and has hired Colombia’s 
armed forces for protection against the social unrest within Colombia, even though they are 
aware of the many crimes committed by the armed forces, as reported by the US State 
Department (Kronforst, 2012). Due to the resources available to BP, they carry an ethical 
responsibility to promote human rights. While corporations are not always morally corrupt, they 
are, per definition, focused on maximizing their profit (Heywood, 2014), and morally correct 
choices can have negative effects on the financial surplus of a corporation which competitor 
corporations can benefit from. In effect, this leads to a disregard of ethical concerns in Colombia 
as there are no actual clauses in contracts binding them to ethical obligations.  
It can be argued that the Colombian government itself carries a responsibility to gauge 
the negative effects of such corporations, and in worse cases cut ties with them. However, the 
government has to consider the development of Colombia, and the income which TNCs bring to 
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the country often seems worth the price. In conclusion, this binds the hands of government, as it 
has to choose between the social well-being of the people or economic well-being of the nation, 
which has the potential of increasing the life quality of the population. Under peaceful conditions 
Foreign Direct Investment is believed to have a positive impact on developing countries by 
increasing life quality measures such as life expectancy, literacy and infant survival rate in host 
countries (Kronforst, 2012). In the context of Colombia, in which many areas are far from 
governmental control, the institutions which are meant to protect and promote the rights of their 
citizens are mostly ineffective, which is shown by the wide prevalence of impunity in regards to 
atrocities. 
Another case where private companies have benefitted from the conflict alongside and 
through the use of paramilitaries, has been through the use of illegally expropriated land. A 
primary example is the expansions of palm oil companies onto the land abandoned by farmers. 
At times, this land would have been abandoned due to violence in region, while other times 
farmers would have been displaced for the sake of mega-projects. Land was often cleared by 
paramilitaries in order for companies to expand (Summers, 2014). One of these was the company 
Daabon, which provided The Body Shop with 90% of all of its palm oil. After the NGO 
Christian Aid revealed the company’s link to paramilitaries and displacement practices to the 
media, the cosmetic giant concluded their commercial relationship (Syal & Brodzinsky, 2010). 
While several Colombian businessmen have been convicted for collaborating with paramilitaries 
for developing palm oil projects (Verdad Abierta, 2014), the Body Shop has been praised for 
cutting its connection. It however remains unknown if the decision, which took the Body Shop 
nine months to take, was merely due to its image being at stake (Glennie, 2010).  
During the administration of former President Uribe, mega-projects and foreign 
investments were highly emphasized in the national development plans. In consequence, the sale 
of mining concessions and international investments proliferated during this period. UN bodies 
have pointed out these plans as a driving cause to forced displacement (ABColombia, 2011). 
Despite the environmental and social costs of these projects, the present administration has 
shown an impetus to continue the development (ibid). This creates a vicious spiral in which 
corporations benefit from human rights violations, further impeding the process of returning 
dispossessed lands (ibid). 
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While the government of Colombia claims to uphold certain ideological stances, it can be 
observed in the content portrayed, that there is a contrast between claim and content, in which 
the social reality does not match the ideology presented, as in accordance to TJ. However, as 
attested, the Colombian government has just cause, at least on macro level, which can excuse for 
some passive acceptance of TNC behavior. This is not the case for TNCs, however, albeit they 
are not bound by the same claims either. TJ has, however, neglected an important aspect without 
which the claims set forth will be hard to implement in reality since TNCs add to the social and 
especially political unrest within Colombia. 
 
7.3.2 International Involvement 
Also, national governments have been eager to provide their assistance to the resource 
rich country. Specifically, the US government has provided large money-flows into the conflict-
prone Colombia. In 1999, Bill Clinton conceived a deal with the Colombian President at the 
time, Pastrana, to support the country in ending the armed conflict and countering drug 
trafficking. While the first draft focused equally on military and development assistance, it was 
altered on US initiative towards an anti-drug strategy. Colombia has now, for more than a 
decade, been the largest recipient of US military aid through the Plan Colombia (AI, 2010). 
Plan Colombia was created as a US strategy to combat drugs and create peace through 
military means. It was a step in the so-called drug war and as the guerrillas were associated with 
the coca production - the plan was directed towards the military elimination of these (Petras, 
2000). Despite international human rights organizations calling for a complete stop of aid to 
Colombia since 1994, the “US assistance to Colombia amounted to an estimated $728 million 
[in 2006], approximately 80% of which was military and police assistance” (AI, 2010). The Plan 
was criticized for several reasons: first of all, because the Colombian armed forces, who were the 
main recipients of support, were known to collaborate with paramilitary groups in their war 
against guerrillas. Human Rights Watch has documented the US Defense Department’s role in 
the creation of ‘killer networks’ - killing civilians suspected of supporting guerrillas (HRW, 
1996). In this context, the US has been accused of further stimulating violence and impunity. 
Furthermore, the Plan presented a drug-focused analysis of the Colombian conflict. Under the 
Plan, the US and Colombia jointly invested more than one percent of Colombia’s GDP per year 
(roughly 1.2 billion dollars each year) to the war against drug trafficking (LSE, 2014). This 
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emphasis stressed certain rhetoric and strategic perspectives, which disregarded the guerrillas’ 
ideological motives and dubbed them ‘narco guerrillas’ (Petras, 2000). In this sense, it ignored 
the deep-rooted causes of the conflict and relied on a military strategy. The result was a profound 
militarization of the country, which solely fostered violence and instability. It has been pointed 
out that Plan Colombia transformed a civil war into a national war (Petras, 2000).  
Another controversial method employed in the Plan was the practice of aerial fumigation 
to eradicate suspected coca crops. The US provided Colombia with small aircrafts, contractors 
and herbicides to carry out aerial spraying of illicit coca crops (LSE, 2014). First of all, this 
method has shown to have very little effect on the quantities of the drug produced and secondly, 
the sprayings have proven to be disastrous for rural populations by creating health problems, 
destroying livelihoods and damaging the environment (ibid). Even though the US congress spent 
over half a billion dollars in this practice between 2000 and 2010, the State Department estimates 
a production increase by 22.6 percent since its beginning (OHCHR, n.d.). At the same time, it 
has contributed to food insecurity, livelihood issues, displacement, and other human rights 
concerns. The consequences have even been felt in Ecuador, where the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Health noted significant health issues in areas close to the Colombian border, due 
to aerial fumigation practices (ibid). 
Through Plan Colombia, the US contributes to representational injustice in regards to 
misframing in Colombia. As explained by Nancy Fraser, misframing obstructs the ability of 
victims to make first order justice claims. In this sense, the US has taken part in monopolizing 
the frame setting towards a frame of drug trafficking. This has not only led to misrecognition of 
groups, it has also implicated a non-democratic structure of justice, in which victims have been 
excluded from negotiating the ‘who’ of justice. As explained by Fraser, for “those persons who 
are denied the chance to press transnational first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution 
and misrecognition cannot proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with struggles 
against misframing” (Fraser, 2008: 21). In accordance with this, the victims of the armed 
conflict can never reach justice by solely focusing on distributive or cultural elements. The 
conflict must be viewed beyond state-territoriality and negotiation of framing has to be included 
if justice efforts should succeed. 
 As shown by these examples, several injustices are linked to the exclusion of 
transnational actors from the justice framework in Colombia. By supporting paramilitaries as 
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well as buying illegal land, these companies are contributing to the victimization of thousands 
(or millions) of Colombians. Approaching justice solely within the Westphalian frame, these 
actors are shielded from the reach of justice. Within a nation-state framework, victims do not 
have access to claim justice from the forces contributing to their rights being disrespected and 
abused.  
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8.0 DISCUSSION 
In the previous chapter, it has been made clear that while having advanced significantly in 
regards to victims’ rights, the framework for justice in Colombia, continues to face several 
challenges. While the greatest progress has been the verbalization and legitimation of victims’ 
rights and justice claims, another crucial step was the official recognition of the existence of an 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, it is seen that emphasis has been skewed towards material 
compensations and that many victims fall through the gaps in the legislation. A central concern 
for human rights advocates is however, whether the implementation of Transitional Justice has 
been motivated mostly by political gain and the protection of economic interests. 
One might be inclined to think so due to the government’s persistency in denying the 
continuous existence of paramilitaries. Even though paramilitaries have been officially 
demobilized, many members are still partaking in illegal activities. In 2012, from all of the 
groups having been caught trying to direct violence against social leaders and other public 
officials, 53% were former paramilitary members (ABColombia, 2012). This leads many to 
regard the demobilization of paramilitaries to be a farce. It has been observed that even though 
paramilitaries demobilized, they continue to have power over entire cities (Theidon, 2007). In 
this sense, the economic structures and foundation of paramilitaries still exist and are being 
supported from the highest of public and private spheres. Even though the image has shifted, it 
seems reality remains unchanged (Uprimny & Saffon, 2007). Thus, despite a decrease in 
homicides and arms in public spaces it is “clear that paramilitarismo has yet to be dismantled” 
(Theidon, 2007: 85). Not recognizing their existence, however, implies that their victims are not 
recognized as victims of the armed conflict and therefore are not covered by the TJ framework. 
This excludes a large amount of people affected under the hand of paramilitaries, even after the 
official declaration that the phenomena had concluded21.  
 There are several external factors that might have incited the government to adopt a TJ 
framework. When paramilitaries were the strongest, they had an income of 3.5-5 billion dollars 
per year from drug trafficking (Grecko, 2011). On top of this come royalties from public 
security, gasoline and carbon, which they secured through the use of threats, violence and 
extensive links of corruption. It is therefore hard to imagine, that the leading bodies of 
                                                
21 See section 3.2 
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government have been completely unaware of what was happening. For the same reason, it has 
been suggested that there was a national interest from above in letting the demobilization of 
paramilitaries look successful. So why would the government be interested in claiming 
paramilitaries had ceased to exist, if they had not? Historically the government has suppressed 
the rural poor and guerrilla groups emerging from them, as they posed a threat to the governing 
parties. Furthermore it collaborated with paramilitaries in fighting the guerrillas (Garcia-Godos 
& Lid). In this sense, the paramilitaries have been a valuable tool for the Colombian governing 
by doing its ‘dirty work’ and fighting guerrillas back with violence. Furthermore “[c]onfession 
means truth (...) [b]ut truth is not desired by people who have supported (...) the paramilitaries 
financially or have collaborated with these groups in other ways” (Former Colombian Vice 
President Francisco Santos in Bronstein, 2011). This might have been the incentive for the 
implementation of Law 1424 from 2010, which establishes that nothing from paramilitaries’ 
confessions can be used as a legal proof of crimes (AI, 2012). 
There has also been an international pressure for Colombia to focus more on reintegration 
in DDR programs and link these to Transitional Justice (Theidon, 2007). In february 2005 
Colombia got the message from its international donors, that in order to receive aid for the 
demobilization of paramilitaries it had to pass a legislation that would assure accountability, 
justice and reparations. Five months later the Law 975 was passed, and Colombia received the 
requested support from the U.S. among others (Bronstein, 2005). These factors have led sceptics 
to claim that “[t]he Colombian state used the rhetoric of transitional justice to produce an image, 
mainly aimed at the international community of donors and human rights organizations, that the country 
enjoys stability, an end to the war, and a post-conflict situation” (Vidal-Lopez, 2012: 14). Thus, 
receiving donor money, avoiding criticism from NGOs, as well as seeming more attractive to 
foreign investments, have all been motivating factors for implementing a Transitional Justice 
framework. 
According to these factors, it seems the Colombian government is weighing peace and 
stability higher than justice. It has therefore been argued that Transitional Justice has been used 
in a manipulative way and served to secure impunity and unequal power relations22 (Uprimny & 
Saffon, 2007). In order to overcome injustice, justice cannot be regarded an obstacle to peace. 
Rather, the emphasis has to be shifted towards victims’ rights in a democratic process of 
                                                
22 See section 4.0 
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Transitional Justice (ibid). To do so, the deep-seated power structures produced by illegal ties 
and complicities have to be dissolved. 
This entails opening up for justice claims in regards to all justice dimensions, as 
explained by Nancy Fraser. While recognizing the conflict for what it is has been an important 
step in this direction, this should be taken further into governmental institutions. However, as 
discovered in the previous section, Transitional Justice fails to keep non-state actors accountable 
for their contribution to atrocities. As this is a symptom of misframing, as defined by Nancy 
Fraser, participation should be taken a step further to include second-order meta-levels of justice. 
In this sense, there is a need for institutions in which the frame of Transitional Justice can be 
negotiated and revised in a democratic manner. These institutions should be built upon a 
transformative approach to the politics of framing. This entails challenging the state-territorial 
principle for establishing the ‘who’ of justice (Fraser, 2008). While being an important step by 
Law 1448 that victims have been included in writing history, participation should be crucial in 
institutions debating the ‘how’ of justice. 
 In a study in which demobilized combatants were asked how they would define justice, 
most understood it along the lines of ‘an eye for an eye’, while hardly any referred to the state as 
an actor of justice (Theidon, 2007). This reflects a lack of legal alternatives for dispute 
resolution, as well as a low trust in the official judicial system. In the current peace negotiations 
the FARC have stressed that there will be no peace unless there is justice, as it is not only an 
armed but a social conflict (Vazquez, 2014). The social issues that awoke the conflict thus have 
to be addressed in order to assure peace. 
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CONCLUSION 
How does the Transitional Justice framework contribute to fostering justice in Colombia? 
Since the implementation of Transitional Justice in 2002, Colombia has taken many steps 
towards establishing accountability for human rights abuses and creating a framework for 
victims’ restitutions. Through the Victims’ Law, the conflict has finally been admitted for what it 
is - an internal armed conflict. This has not only opened up for an official recognition of victim’s 
rights but has also created a legitimate sphere to make such justice claims. 
         Nevertheless, as Transitional Justice has, until now, been associated with post-conflict 
scenarios, its implementation in Colombia bears the risk of disregarding the fact that the conflict 
has not ended. While the legal framework provides for reparation mechanisms, it has the 
potential to exclude individuals who have been victimized recently and continue to be so. This is 
further crystallized through the official claim that the phenomenon of paramilitaries has 
concluded in Colombia and the following categorization of continuously existing ones as regular 
criminal groups. 
         An in-depth analysis of the legal justice framework shows that elements of distributive 
justice are emphasized, particularly through the land restitution programs. These, however, show 
institutionalized patterns of cultural values, leading to misrecognition of certain cultural groups. 
The framework of Transitional Justice, in its approach to justice, thus leads to further injustices. 
Nancy Fraser explains, that unless justice is approached three-dimensionally, encompassing 
distribution, recognition and representation equally, justice efforts will most likely not succeed. 
Furthermore the state-territorial frame has been taken for granted in the legal framework, not 
leaving any space open for challenging non-domestic actors having contributed to the 
victimizations. This creates a sort of meta-injustice as victims are hindered from confronting the 
forces that oppress them. 
         Until the question of the frame is included in justice, debated together with claims for 
distribution and recognition, these elements will keep reinforcing one another in a vicious circle. 
In order to break this circle, Colombia will have to approach justice in a post-Westphalian frame 
by creating institutions in which the justice framework can be negotiated democratically. If they 
succeed to do so, the virtues of Transitional Justice can finally be exploited to the fullest - and 
maybe this could open up for a new way of theorizing justice in transitions.  
49 
 
9.0 AFTERTHOUGHTS 
The beginning of this study started off with an interest in Colombia where Transitional Justice 
was being implemented parallel to the ongoing conflict. As Transitional Justice takes up a central 
element of focus, its conceptual has been unraveled in the literature review. In order to 
understand the specificity of the case, special attention was furthermore given to the historical 
context in Colombia. The perspective of critical theory was chosen as a tool for taking account 
for social facts as being historical and therefore seeing probability. This allowed to view history 
as a non-linear process but rather as a dialectic one. The immanent critique is furthermore a 
useful tool to pinpoint misalignments between the government’s promises and its actions. 
          Due to the complex character of the conflict, the diversity of actors have played different 
roles throughout the course of history, also depending on the viewer's perspective. It is however 
acknowledged that history is not neutral. This study therefore seeks to understand historical 
representations in their context and unravel representative motivations.  
 Accounting for context, however, implies the choice of contextual factors and 
simultaneous disregard of others. This study has focused on socio-economic contextual factors. 
Factors such as Colombia being a postcolonial country, gender perspectives, political analysis, 
and development perspectives were deliberately excluded in order to preserve a narrow focus. 
Another focus, while still postcolonial, would be the level of international involvement in 
domestic Colombian politics and international relations. 
Another approach could have been a quantitative one. In this regard, a causal analysis 
could have revealed hard data and given a straightforward answer about the success, or lack 
thereof, of Transitional Justice in Colombia. An alternative approach in terms of theory could 
have been analyzing the case in terms of conflict mediation theory. This would have provided 
insight to the interests of the different actors and stakeholders in the conflict.  
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